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Abstract   Let us assume that the basic claim of the belief-desire theory of emotion is true: 
What, then, is an emotion? According to Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009), emotions are 
mental compounds that emerge from the gestalt integration of beliefs, desires, and hedonic 
feelings (pleasure or displeasure). By contrast, I propose that emotions are affective feel-
ings caused by beliefs and desires, without the latter being a part of the emotion. My argu-
mentation for the causal feeling theory proceeds in three steps. First, I argue that affective 
feelings should be regarded as components of emotions because this assumption provides 
the best available explanation of the phenomenal character and the intensity of emotional 
experiences. Second, I examine the two main arguments for regarding beliefs and desires as 
emotion components—that doing so is needed to explain the finer distinctions among emo-
tions and their object-directedness—and argue that they are unconvincing: Emotions can be 
distinguished by referring to their cognitive and motivational causes, and their appearance 
of object-directedness could be an illusion. Third, I present three objections against the hy-
pothesis that beliefs and desires are components of emotions: This hypothesis fails, at sec-
ond sight, to explain the directedness of emotions at specific objects; it has difficulty ac-
counting for the duration of emotional reactions caused by the fulfillment of desires and the 
disconfirmation of beliefs; and there are reasons to question the existence of the postulated 
emotional gestalts and the process that presumably generates them. The causal feeling the-
ory avoids these problems. I therefore recommend abandoning the belief-desire compound 
theory of the nature of emotions in favor of the causal feeling theory. However, a partial 
reconciliation of the two theories is possible with respect to the concept of “affectively 
tinged” thoughts. 
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1. The Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion 
1.1 Basic Assumptions of BDTE 
The task of emotion psychology is to develop an accurate, reasonably detailed and compre-
hensive model of the human emotion system, including its interactions with other subsys-
tems of the mind. I believe that, of the different theoretical approaches to emotion, the cog-
nitive approach holds the greatest promise for attaining this goal. This belief is shared by 
many of my fellow psychologists, which partly explains why cognitive theories have domi-
nated the psychological discussion of emotions during the past 30 years (e.g., Frijda, 1986; 
Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Ortony, Clore & Collins; 1988; Scherer; 
2001; review in Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). The same is true for philosophy (e.g., Lyons, 
1980; Roberts, 2003; Solomon, 1976; review in Goldie, 2007). Likewise, cognitive theories 
of emotion dominate artificial intelligence research on emotions (e.g., Marsella, Gratch, & 
Petta, 2010).  
However, the cognitive approach to emotions is not homogeneous. Rather, there are dif-
ferent cognitive emotion theories, and some are more plausible than others (see e.g., 
Reisenzein & Döring, 2009). In this article, I restrict my attention to what I regard as the 
most plausible version of cognitive emotion theory: the cognitive-motivational, or belief-
desire theory of emotion (BDTE). Originally proposed by philosophers (e.g., Davis, 1981; 
Green, 1992; Marks, 1982; for an early version, see Meinong, 1894 [summarized in 
Reisenzein, 2006]), BDTE is attracting increasing interest in psychology and artificial intel-
ligence research (e.g., Reisenzein, 2001a; 2009a; 2009b; Mellers, 2000; Marsella et al., 
2010). Writing at the intersection of these areas, Maria Miceli and Cristiano Castelfranchi 
have been long-standing proponents of BDTE (e.g., Miceli & Castelfranchi, 1997; 2002; 
2007; Castelfranchi & Miceli, 2009).  
Seen from up close, BDTE itself turns out to be a family of theories rather than a single, 
uniform theory. What unites the members of the BDTE family is a basic assumption about 
the “psychological preconditions” (Meinong, 1894) of emotions. The assumption can be 
formulated as follows: A central subset of the mental states presystematically regarded as 
emotions—roughly, those that seem to be directed at propositional objects (i.e., actual or 
possible states of affairs)—presuppose, for their existence, beliefs and desires concerning 
these objects.2 Beliefs and desires, in turn, are regarded in BDTE as basic kinds of represen-
tational mental states that cannot be reduced to one another: Beliefs aim at truth and have a 
cognitive or information-providing function, whereas desires aim at satisfaction and have a 
motivational function (Green, 1992, p. 18).  
To illustrate, according to BDTE, Mary feels happy that Mr. Schroiber was elected  
chancellor (only3) if she comes to believe that this state of affairs p is the case, and if she 
desires p; whereas Mary feels unhappy that Schroiber was elected chancellor if she is 
                                                          
2 Strictly speaking, this is true only for emotional reactions to events considered to be real (Meinong [1910] 
called them “serious emotions”), not for emotional reactions to fictions (Meinong’s “fantasy emotions”). 
However, BDTE can be extended to deal with fantasy emotions, by replacing beliefs with assumptions 
(Meinong, 1910; Reisenzein, Meyer, & Schützwohl, 2003; Reisenzein, 2012). 
3 As far as I can see, all BDTE theorists assume that under normal conditions (roughly, in the normally 
functioning, awake adult), the co-occurrence of the beliefs and desires required for an emotion is also, at 
least causally, sufficient for the occurrence of that emotion. Given normal circumstances, the “if” in the fol-
lowing if-then laws of BDTE can therefore be read as “if and only if” rather than just as “only if.” 
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averse to p or “diswants” p to happen (which I shall here analyze as: she desires not-p), and 
comes to believe that p is the case. Hope and fear can be analyzed by allowing for beliefs 
held with uncertainty: Mary hopes for p if she desires p but is uncertain about p (i.e., her 
subjective probability that p is the case is between 0 and 1), and she fears p if she desires 
not-p and is uncertain about p. Several other emotions can be brought into the scope of 
BDTE if one takes the experiencer’s pre-existing beliefs into consideration (Reisenzein, 
2009a): Mary is surprised that p if she up to now believed not-p and now comes to believe 
p; she is disappointed that not-p if she desires p and up to now believed p, but now comes 
to believe not-p; and she is relieved that not-p if she is averse to p and up to now believed 
p, but now comes to believe not-p. Social and moral emotions such as joy and pity for an-
other, or guilt and moral elevation, can be analyzed in BDTE by introducing other-
regarding desires—desires that concern the fate and actions of other agents (see Reisenzein, 
2010; and Castelfranchi and Miceli, 2009; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007).  
Although the belief-desire theory of emotion has been around for some time, it has so far 
been only partially explored, both theoretically and empirically. At least it has been much 
less explored than the belief-desire theory of action, BDTE’s cousin in the domain of goal-
directed behavior. Just as BDTE assumes that beliefs and desires are the mental precondi-
tions of emotion, the belief-desire theory of action assumes that beliefs and desires—in this 
case, beliefs about means-ends relations, and desires for the ends—are the mental precondi-
tions of action (e.g., Conte & Castelfranchi, 1995). The belief-desire theory of action has, 
under a variety of different names and in several conceptual disguises, become the object of 
an extensive research program in several disciplines spanning philosophy, psychology, so-
ciology, and artificial intelligence (for a selective sample of this literature, see e.g., Brat-
man, 1987; Conte & Castelfranchi, 1995; Feather, 1982; Fox & Poldrack, 2009, Gold-
thorpe, 1998; Mele, 1992; Reisenzein, 2001b; Wooldridge, 2002). No comparably 
extensive research program exists to date for BDTE, although several explorations of the 
theoretical domain have been made (e.g., Castelfranchi & Miceli, 2009; Davis, 1981; 
Green, 1992; Mellers, 2000; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 1997; Reisenzein, 2009a; 2009b; 
2010; Reisenzein & Junge, 2012). As Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) note, further explora-
tion of BDTE is needed. 
1.2. Emotions: Belief-and-desire-caused Feelings or Compounds of 
Beliefs, Desires, and Feelings? 
In this article, I focus on one of the issues that divide the members of the BDTE family: the 
question of what an emotion is in BDTE. The answer to this question—the question of the 
nature of emotion—is intimately connected to the interpretation of the basic claim of  
BDTE, that beliefs and desires are necessary preconditions of emotions (see also, Reisen-
zein, 1994a; 2000). Three main proposals regarding the more precise relation between be-
liefs/desires and emotions, and corresponding to these, three main proposals regarding the 
nature of emotion in  BDTE have been made. Illustrated for the case of happiness about p, 
they are as follows.  
1. The causal view holds that the belief that p and the desire for p are (necessary) causes 
of happiness about p, whereas the emotion is a separate mental state, such as a feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure (e.g., Reisenzein, 2009a). 
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2. The part-whole view claims that the belief that p and the desire for p are not, or at 
least not only, the causes of the emotion, but parts of the emotion. Correspondingly, the 
emotion is conceived of as a complex mental state consisting of the co-occurrence of (2a) 
the belief that p and the desire for p (e.g., Marks, 1982); or (2b) the belief and desire plus 
other components (e.g., a feeling of pleasure or displeasure). 
3. The fusion view maintains that happiness about p is a new mental state that emerges 
through a process of “fusion” (Green, 1992) or mental integration from (3a) the belief that p 
and the desire for p (Green, 1992) or from (3b) these two and further components (e.g., 
feelings of pleasure or displeasure; Castelfranchi and Miceli, 2009).4 Characteristic of the 
fusion view is not only the assumption that the output of the fusion process—the emotion—
is a phenomenally unitary mental state; but also the assumption that this state has emergent 
properties, such as a unique experiential quality (Castelfranchi & Miceli, 2009; Green, 
1992). 
In this article, I compare two specific versions of the causal view and the fusion view of 
the nature of emotions in BDTE: the causal feeling theory proposed by Reisenzein (2009a; 
2009b), and the belief-desire compound, or emotional gestalt theory proposed by Cas-
telfranchi and Miceli (2009). 
1.2.1 The Causal Feeling Theory 
Reisenzein (2009a) proposed a computational (C) model of the belief-desire theory of emo-
tion called CBDTE, according to which emotions are the products of two hardwired com-
parator mechanisms that service the belief-desire system, the belief-desire comparator 
(BDC) and the belief-belief comparator (BBC). These mechanisms constantly compare, at 
an unconscious level of information processing, newly acquired beliefs about the world or 
the self with, respectively, pre-existing desires (BDC) and beliefs (BBC). If a match (p; p) 
or a mismatch (p; not-p) between the contents of a new belief and those of an existing belief 
or desire is detected, the comparator mechanisms generate nonpropositional, sensation-like 
output signals that communicate the information about the detection of the match or mis-
match to other cognitive subsystems. Based on this computational explication of BDTE, I 
then proposed that emotions should be identified with the output signals generated by the 
BDC and the BBC (see also, Reisenzein, 2009b). This proposal implies that emotions, al-
though caused by certain belief-desire constellations, are distinct from the latter and do not 
contain them as components. Specifically, emotions are nonconceptual and nonproposi-
tional mental states that are, when conscious, experienced as feelings of pleasure and dis-
pleasure, surprise and expectancy confirmation, combinations of these feelings (e.g., disap-
pointment, relief), and hope and fear. A main reason for proposing this theoretical (theory-
                                                          
4 Philosophers typically classify the causal version of BDTE as a “noncognitive” theory of emotion. The 
reason is that their criteria for classifying emotion theories are the theories’ assumptions about the nature of 
emotion. The causal theory, although assuming that emotions presuppose cognitions as their causes, takes 
the emotion itself to be a noncognitive mental state—at least in the sense that it is not, and does not include, 
a belief. (Note, however, that this still allows the emotion to be cognitive in the wider sense of being a rep-
resentational mental state). Theories of types 2b and 3b are sometimes called “hybrid” theories of emotion, 
because they assume that emotions contain both cognitive and noncognitive components (e.g., Reisenzein, 
1994a). By contrast, theories of types 2a and 3a are called “pure” cognitive (or cognitive-motivational) the-
ories of emotion. For further discussion, see e.g., Green (1992), Prinz (2004), Reisenzein (1994a), and Rei-
senzein and Döring (2009). 
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based; see Section 2) definition of emotion—the identification of emotions with the output 
signals of the BDC and BBC—was causal-functional: These signals recommended them-
selves as the scientific referents of the term “emotion” because, assuming that CBDTE is a 
correct description of the emotion-generating mechanisms, they constitute the “causal hub 
in the wheel of emotion” (Reisenzein, 2009a): They are proximately caused by beliefs and 
desires (the inputs of the emotion mechanisms) and they are in turn (partial) causes of all 
emotional effects postulated in the theory—emotional experience, shifts of attention, up-
dates of the belief-desire system, emotional actions, expressions, and physiological 
changes. In addition, I argued that the proposed theoretical definition of emotion provides a 
natural explanation of the salient properties of emotional experiences, in particular their 
phenomenal quality and intensity (see also, Reisenzein, 2009b).  
1.2.2 The Belief-Desire Compound (Emotional Gestalt) Theory  
In contrast to the causal feeling theory, Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) propose that emo-
tions are mental gestalts in the sense of the Gestalt theorists (e.g., Köhler, 1947). As the au-
thors explain, these emotional gestalts  
“result from the ‘fusion’ [Gestalt integration] of the BD [belief-desire] compound with affect 
(feelings of pleasure or displeasure). In this process, the BD compound is hedonically colored by 
affect, while the latter is specified and qualified by the BD compound. The emotional experience 
resulting from this fusion is…an emergent property which cannot be traced back to any single 
component of the emotion” (Castelfranchi & Miceli, 2009, p. 228).  
To illustrate this theory, Mary’s happiness that Schroiber was elected chancellor would re-
sult from the fusion, or gestalt integration, of Mary’s belief that this state of affairs p is the 
case, her desire for p, and the pleasant feeling generated by the co-occurrence of these two 
mental states. According to Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009), the resulting emotional gestalt, 
although being a causal effect of the belief that p and the desire for p, can also be said to 
contain these mental states as parts.5 Thus, the gestalt theory of emotion combines assump-
tions of the causal and the part-whole theory. It may be noted that the gestalt theory repre-
sents one of two existing explications of the idea that emotions result from a fusion or inte-
gration of several components. The other explication of this idea holds that the fusion 
process is a process of categorization in which the different components of an emotion in-
stance or token are subsumed under an emotion schema (e.g., Mandler, 1984; Barrett, 
2006). For discussions about this alternative, see Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) and 
Reisenzein (1994a). 
My aim in this article is to compare the two described theories concerning the nature of 
emotion in BDTE, the causal feeling theory and the emotional gestalt theory. This compari-
son is facilitated by the fact that, apart from their different assumptions about the nature of 
                                                          
5 At first sight, a component α of a complex mental state γ = (α  & β)  cannot also be the cause of γ, for that 
would imply self-causation, something generally regarded as impossible (see e.g., Mackie, 1974; Reisen-
zein & Schönpflug, 1992). Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009, p. 229) concede this point but argue as follows: 
“the BD [belief-desire] compound…(α)…together with affect (β) causes the emotional gestalt (γ)…when 
α is included into γ, it is no longer there as such; rather, in virtue of its being part of the whole (γ), it 
changes into α’. This is analogous to a line segment that, when it merges with other lines into the gestalt of 
a triangle, is no longer perceived as a (mere) line segment but as a side of the triangle. If this is accepted, 
one can legitimately talk about the BD compound as being both a cause (α) and a constituent (α’) of emo-
tions.” 
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emotion, the versions of BDTE endorsed by Castelfranchi and Miceli and myself are close. 
Most important for the following discussion, both versions of BDTE assume that “emo-
tional” belief-desire configurations (those considered to be necessary for an emotion; e.g., 
in the case of happiness about p, the desire that p plus the belief that p) cause feelings of 
pleasure or displeasure, and that these hedonic feelings are an essential component of emo-
tions (in CBDTE: for all emotions but hedonically neutral surprise). Furthermore, we agree 
that the computational processes that underlie the causal link between belief and desire on 
the one hand, and hedonic feelings on the other hand, involve a comparison of belief and 
desire (on this point, see also Miceli & Castelfranchi, 1997). However, whereas I propose to 
identify emotions with the output signals generated by the belief-desire comparator—as 
well as the belief-belief comparator, which is not explicitly considered a part of the emotion 
mechanism by Miceli and Castelfranchi—Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) identify the 
emotion with a mental gestalt that integrates belief, desire, and hedonic affect. These differ-
ences in the theoretical definition of emotion imply another, causal or processual difference 
between our respective versions of BDTE: Whereas Castelfranchi and Miceli are commit-
ted to the existence of the hypothesized gestalt formation process and its outcomes, the 
emotional gestalts, CBDTE assumes neither a gestalt formation process nor emotional ge-
stalts.6 Castelfranchi and Miceli’s version of BDTE is therefore, in this respect at least, 
more complex than CBDTE.  
2. What is a Definition of Emotion? 
Before proceeding, I need to address an antecedent issue. This issue concerns the metatheo-
retical status of the problem under discussion, the question “What is an emotion in BDTE?” 
The issue addressed by the question “What is an emotion?” is traditionally called the 
problem of the nature of emotion. Alternatively, it is called the problem of the definition of 
emotion (e.g., Scherer, 2005). I will use the latter formulation because it is more general. 
As usually understood, a definition is a specification of the essential or necessary (or, if 
such don’t exist, at least the typical) features of a class of objects. Since Aristotle, two dif-
ferent bases of definitional necessity have been distinguished: linguistic conventions and 
the structure of language-independent reality. These two bases of necessity are reflected in 
the traditional distinction between nominal and real definitions (e.g., Boyd, 2002). As tradi-
tionally understood, nominal definitions reflect conventions about how a term is to be used, 
whereas real definitions capture the pre-existing essential properties of a class of objects.  
In terms of this distinction, the question “What is an emotion?” seems to be prima facie 
asking for a real definition: a description of the nature of emotions, their pre-existing essen-
tial features. And this is how the question has been understood by most classical (e.g., 
                                                          
6 Apart from the question of the nature of emotion, there are several other differences between our respec-
tive versions of BDTE. For example, Miceli and Castelfranchi (1997) assume that at least for some kinds of 
emotions, the belief-desire comparison process involves meta-beliefs about the presence of a discrepancy 
between belief and desire, whereas I reject this idea (Reisenzein, 2009a). I distinguish between emotions 
and emotional experience, whereas Castelfranchi and Miceli largely equate the two. And whereas I assume 
that the emotions covered by BDTE require a propositional representation system (a language of thought; 
Fodor, 1987), Castelfranchi and Miceli (personal communication) find this assumption too restrictive and 
prefer a more liberal view of the format of the mental representations that may underlie the emotions cov-
ered by BDTE. In this article, I will ignore these differences because they are not decisive for the present 
discussion of the nature of emotions in BDTE. 
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James, 1890/1950; Meinong, 1894; Wundt, 1896) and many contemporary emotion theo-
rists (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Schachter, 1964), at least in psychology.7 However, during the 
heyday of logical empiricism, the view became popular that the concept of real definition is 
obscure and unscientific (e.g., Hempel, 1965). For the adherents of this view, the question 
“What is an emotion?” and parallel questions about specific emotions, such as “What is 
fear?”, which prima facie seem to ask for real definitions, are either nonsensical or need to 
be reinterpreted in ways consistent with the idea of a nominal definition. One such way is 
to reinterpret the problem of the definition of emotion as a problem of terminological stan-
dardization, that is, of getting emotion researchers to agree to a stipulation about how to use 
the term “emotion” (Scherer, 2005). Another way is to reinterpret the question “What is an 
emotion?” as asking for the meaning of emotion words in ordinary language (e.g., “What 
do people mean by ‘fear’?”) (Hempel, 1965), with the implicit assumption being that the 
ordinary language definitions of emotions are themselves nominal (i.e., based on linguistic 
conventions). 
However, since the demise of logical empiricism and the rise of the “new scientific real-
ism” philosophies of science, the idea that some definitions—in fact, those of greatest in-
terest to science—are after all a form of real definitions has gained renewed respectability 
(for details, see Boyd, 1991; 2002; Griffith, 1997). According to the modern view, a real 
definition is a hypothesis about the “deep structure” or core constitution of the objects in 
the class picked out, more or less precisely, by an extension-fixing device, such as a list of 
examples or a set of typical features. The paradigm case is the scientific definition of water, 
identified by a set of features such as “the clear, odorless liquid found in lakes and rivers, 
essential for animal and plant life (etc.)” as “H2O.” 
In line with others (e.g., Griffith, 1997; see also Charland, 2002), I believe that this “real 
definition” view is the correct model for the definition of emotions (Reisenzein, 1994a; 
2007; Reisenzein & Schönpflug, 1992). According to this understanding, a definition of  
emotion is an empirical hypothesis about the nature or constitution of the states identified, 
more or less precisely, with the help of a list of paradigmatic examples (e.g., joy, sadness, 
fear, hope, disappointment, pity, joy for another…) and a set of typical features of the items 
on this list (a “working definition” of emotions; see Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 
2001). This hypothesis about the nature of emotion is always formulated against the back-
ground of a theory of emotion generation (and the effects of emotions). Hence, the defini-
tion of emotions always presupposes such a causal theory, and it stands and falls with this 
theory (Reisenzein & Schönpflug, 1992; Reisenzein, 2007). 
Accordingly, the title question of this article, “What is an emotion in BDTE?” asks for a 
theoretical identification of emotions while presupposing the truth of BDTE. This means at 
minimum that the basic assumption of BDTE—beliefs and desires are necessary for emo-
tions—is accepted. However, when comparing Castelfranchi and Miceli’s (2009) view of 
the nature of emotion in BDTE with my own view, a richer version of BDTE can be pre-
supposed that includes additional shared assumptions; in particular, the assumption that be-
liefs and desires cause feelings of pleasure and displeasure. 
                                                          
7 Supporting this view, the history of emotion psychology is full of attempts to empirically test proposed 
definitions of emotion (e.g., those of James, 1890; or Schachter, 1964). The view that an emotion definition 
is a nominal definition would make this research activity look utterly irrational. These empirical tests, how-
ever, make perfect sense if an emotion definition is a real definition—an empirical claim about the essence 
of emotions (Reisenzein, 1994a). 
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Given this understanding of the problem of the definition of emotion, how can this prob-
lem be solved? In principle, I propose, it can be solved by means of an inference to the best 
explanation (e.g., Lipton, 2004). That is, different proposals concerning the nature of emo-
tion in BDTE—different proposals for the theoretical definition of emotions—are com-
pared in terms of their ability to explain various accepted properties of emotions, such as 
their type distinctions (happiness, fear, etc.), their experiential quality, their intensity, their 
(apparent) object-directedness, and their temporal course; and the theoretical definition of 
emotions that best explains these properties of emotions is (provisionally) accepted.  
One last point: Although I have discussed the question of the definition of emotion for 
emotions in general, it cannot be directly answered on this level. The reason is that emo-
tions always come in more or less specific qualities (happiness, fear, etc.), and that the set 
of emotions demarcated by a working definition has fuzzy boundaries and may comprise 
several distinct subgroups (e.g., “cognitive” versus “sensory” emotions). What one can do, 
however, is to try to answer the definition question for as many paradigmatic emotions as 
possible and try to make plausible that parallel answers can be given in other similar cases 
(see also, Ortony et al., 1988). Furthermore, provided that the presupposed theory of emo-
tion accounts well for paradigmatic emotions, one can and should use the theory itself to 
help decide on its range of application (Reisenzein & Schönpflug, 1992; Reisenzein, 
2009b). This may lead to certain theoretically motivated reclassifications. For example, in 
CBDTE, surprise is classified as an emotion (Reisenzein, 2009a; 2009b). 
In the remainder of this article, I will put the proposed method to work with the aim of 
deciding which of the two described theories of the nature of emotion in BDTE is more 
plausible. My conclusion will be that the gestalt theory of emotion is less successful overall 
in explaining salient properties of emotions than the causal feeling theory. My argumenta-
tion for this conclusion proceeds in three steps. In the first step, I present two arguments for 
the assumption, made by both Castelfranchi and Miceli and myself, that the feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure is a necessary component of emotions: I argue that this assumption 
is the best explanation of the phenomenal character of emotional experiences and their in-
tensity. In the second step, I examine the two main arguments for regarding beliefs and de-
sires as emotion components—that doing so is required to explain the finer distinctions 
among emotions and their object-directedness—and argue that they are unconvincing. In 
step three, I present three objections against the hypothesis that beliefs and desires are com-
ponents of emotions. The causal feeling theory avoids these objections. I therefore recom-
mend abandoning the belief-desire compound theory of the nature of emotion in favor of 
the causal feeling theory.  
3. Why Hedonic Feelings (Pleasure and Displeasure) are Necessary for 
Emotions 
Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) and I agree on an “affect-enriched” version of BDTE: We 
assume that “emotional” belief-desire constellations cause feelings, most importantly of 
pleasure or displeasure, and that these feelings are essential for emotional experience. What 
we disagree on is the more precise theoretical definition of emotion, given these shared as-
sumptions. I propose to identify emotions with the output signals of the emotion-generating 
mechanisms assumed in CBDTE (the BDC and the BBC) that, when conscious, are experi-
enced as feelings of pleasure and displeasure, surprise and expectancy confirmation, mix-
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tures of these, and hope and fear (Reisenzein, 2009a; 2009b). By contrast, Castelfranchi and 
Miceli (2009) propose to identify emotions—which they essentially equate with emotional 
experiences—with “mental compounds,” which they claim emerge from beliefs, desires, 
and hedonic feelings through a further information-processing step, a process that integrates 
beliefs, desires, and feelings into an emotional gestalt. Which of these theoretical defini-
tions of emotion is more plausible? 
As the first step in trying to answer this question, I will present arguments for the shared 
assumption of the two compared views of the nature of emotion: the assumption that feel-
ings of mental pleasure or displeasure are (at least) a necessary component of (most) emo-
tional experiences. Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) do not argue for this assumption, 
probably because it was introspectively evident to them, as it was to numerous classical 
(e.g., Bentham, 1889/1970; Külpe, 1893; Meinong, 1906; Wundt, 1896) and contemporary 
emotion researchers (e.g., Barrett, 2006; Cabanac, 2002; Goldstein, 2002; Mellers, 2000; 
Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Reisenzein, 1994b; 2009b; Russell, 2003). As a matter of 
fact, however, not everybody is convinced that emotions contain a hedonic feeling compo-
nent; therefore, it is necessary to present arguments for this claim. The strongest arguments 
are, I believe, that this assumption provides the best available explanation for (a) the phe-
nomenal character of emotions and (b) their intensity. Note that, to the degree that these ar-
guments are successful, they place an important constraint on theories of the nature of emo-
tions: Any plausible theory of the nature of emotions would then have to assume that 
(most) emotions contain a hedonic feeling component. 
3.1 Explaining the Phenomenal Character of Emotions 
Probably the most salient property of emotions, from the perspective of the experiencing 
person, is their phenomenality, the fact that it “is like” or “feels” a particular way for the 
person to have an emotion (e.g., Reisenzein & Döring, 2009). Although there is a long-
standing and still ongoing debate about how many different affective feeling qualities there 
are, both everyday experience and more formally collected psychological data suggest that, 
barring hedonically neutral surprise (which is included in CBDTE, for theoretical reasons, 
as a limiting case of emotions), all emotional experiences are at least among others charac-
terized by a pleasurable or displeasurable quality, a positive or negative hedonic tone (see 
e.g., Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Külpe, 1893; Mellers, 2000; Reisenzein, 
1994b; Russell, 2003; Reisenzein & Junge, 2006; Wundt, 1896). The phenomenal quality, 
specifically the hedonic tone of emotional experiences, thus needs to be accounted for by 
any plausible theory of emotion. 
The assumption that “emotional” constellations of beliefs and desires cause feelings of 
pleasure or displeasure, and that these feelings are necessary components of emotional ex-
periences, provides a natural explanation for the hedonic tone of emotions (Reisenzein, 
2009b). A feeling of mental pleasure or pain, conceived of as a sensation-like mental state 
similar to sensations of color, tone, or temperature, explains the hedonic quality of emo-
tions in a natural way because it belongs to the essence of sensations to have a phenomenal 
quality (Külpe, 1893; Wundt, 1896). In fact, I believe that the assumption that emotions 
contain—or even are—feelings of mental pleasure or mental pain provides the best avail-
able explanation of the hedonic tone of emotions. However, I will first argue for a weaker 
claim: To account for the hedonic tone of emotions in BDTE, one must assume that “emo-
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tional” belief-desire configurations cause a separate mental state that carries the hedonic 
tone. The main argument for this conclusion is that attempts to explain the hedonic charac-
ter of emotions in terms of belief and desire alone seem to meet with insuperable difficul-
ties. To see this, let us consider how BDTE theorists might try to account for the hedonic 
character of emotions in terms of belief and desire (for additional discussions, see Pugmire, 
1998; Salmela, 2002). In principle, these theorists have two options. First, they can try to 
explain the hedonic quality of emotions by appealing to the phenomenal properties of be-
liefs and desires. Second, they can assume that hedonic tone is an emergent property of the 
fusion of “emotional” belief-desire configurations (Green, 1992). Let us examine these two 
options in turn. 
3.1.1 Explaining Hedonic Quality by Appealing to the Phenomenal Properties of 
Beliefs and Desires  
The first stepping stone for BDTE theorists who try to explain the experiential quality of 
emotions by appealing to the phenomenal qualities of beliefs and desires is the intuition that 
these mental states do not have any experiential quality (e.g., Green, 1992; Smith, 1987; for 
a recent overview of this debate about “cognitive phenomenology,” see Bayne & Monta-
gue, 2011). According to this intuition, being conscious of our occurrent beliefs or desires 
consists exclusively of our being immediately (noninferentially) aware of them when they 
occur; but there is nothing it is like to have them. 
However, even assuming that beliefs and desires do have phenomenal character, as some 
have argued (see Bayne & Montague, 2011; I concede this possibility in Reisenzein, 
2009a), it is questionable whether this character is of the right kind to explain the experien-
tial and specifically the hedonic quality of emotions.  
(1) The phenomenal qualities of belief and desire, considered separately, seem unsuited 
to explain the hedonic tone of emotions. Beliefs—at least the factual beliefs regarded as 
preconditions of emotions in BDTE—do not have any intrinsic pleasure-pain quality. With 
respect to conscious desires, it is more plausible to argue that they are occasionally charac-
terized by hedonic tone (e.g., Marks, 1982). However, often they are not, and when they 
are, they seem to be mainly unpleasant, particularly when they are intense (e.g., cravings). 
Furthermore, the hedonic tone of an emotion is sometimes the opposite of the hedonic tone 
most plausibly attributed to the underlying desire. The satisfaction of unpleasant cravings is 
still pleasurable; likewise, the hedonic tone of relief about the non-occurrence of an unde-
sired state of affairs p is pleasurable, whereas the hedonic tone of the underlying desire (the 
aversion to p) is, if anything, negative.8 Finally, the pleasure of desire fulfillment cannot be 
the hedonic tone of the desire because desires are extinguished upon their subjective ful-
fillment (see Section 5.2).  
(2) If these intuitions are correct, then the hedonic quality of emotions also cannot be 
explained in terms of a mixture of the experiential qualities of beliefs and desires—if only 
because the belief, lacking hedonic tone, cannot contribute anything useful to that mixture. 
                                                          
8 When reflecting on the hedonic tone of desires, one should keep in mind that one becomes aware of a de-
sire mainly when one acquires the belief that a state of affairs that fulfills or frustrates the desire is possible 
or certain—that is, at the time when an emotion occurs. There is thus the danger of attributing the hedonic 
quality of emotions to the desire, in which case the desire account of the hedonic tone of emotions would be 
circular (see also Stocker, 1983).  
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3.1.2 Hedonic Quality as an Emergent Property  
To overcome the difficulties of explaining the hedonic quality of emotions in terms of the 
phenomenal qualities of beliefs and desires, Green (1992) proposed that emotions are the 
products of a fusion of “emotional” belief-desire constellations, and that hedonic quality is 
an emergent property of the resulting mental states.9 If we assume, as I think we must, that 
the proposed fusion process is a causal process, Green’s suggestion combines two claims: 
(a) “Emotional” belief-desire constellations cause another mental state with hedonic proper-
ties, and (b) this mental state is a holistic compound of beliefs and desires. Of these two 
claims, the second remains largely metaphorical until the details of the proposed fusion 
process are spelled out. However, about all that is said about this process is that its inputs 
are beliefs and desires, whereas its output is a mental compound, which contains beliefs and 
desires as parts, and has emergent properties including hedonic quality and intensity.10 
Hence, this second claim is at best a promissory note of future explanation.11 Therefore, we 
are left with the first claim. However, the first claim is identical to the hypothesis I pres-
ently seek to establish: The carrier of hedonic tone is a mental state caused by beliefs and 
desires. 
The discussed options seem to exhaust the possibilities of explaining the hedonic quality 
of emotions in terms of the beliefs and desires that, according to BDTE, are necessary con-
ditions of emotions. The failure of these explanatory attempts implies that beliefs and de-
sires alone are insufficient to explain the hedonic quality of emotions; an additional mental 
state caused by “emotional” belief-desire constellations needs to be assumed. This conclu-
sion does not per se entail that this additional component of emotion, the carrier of hedonic 
tone, is a sensation-like, intrinsically objectless feeling, as Reisenzein (2009a; 2009b) and 
Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) assume. There is at least one alternative possibility. Illus-
trated for the case of happiness about p, this is the proposal that the belief that p and the de-
sire for p cause another intentional mental state directed at p, F(p), that is simultaneously a 
feeling of pleasure. The theory that emotions are, or at least comprise, “intentional feelings” 
(specifically, of pleasure or displeasure) was originally advanced by Franz Brentano and his 
students, in particular, Alexius Meinong (1894; 1906) and Carl Stumpf (1899; see Reisen-
zein and Schönpflug, 1992) and has recently been reproposed by several philosophers (e.g., 
Goldie, 2000; Helm, 2001). Although attractive in other respects—in particular because it 
                                                          
9 Hence, Green assumes that hedonic tone is a property of the output of the fusion of “emotional” belief-
desire constellations. By contrast, Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) assume that feelings of pleasure or 
displeasure are one of several inputs to the fusion process that results in the emotion.  
10 In addition, Green (1992, p. 97) draws an analogy with the process of chemical bonding (e.g., of hydro-
gen and oxygen into water). However, this analogy is presumably meant only to document the existence of 
physical compounding processes whose products have emergent properties, and thereby to raise the prob-
ability that analogous processes might exist in the mental realm; it is not meant to imply any deeper similar-
ity of the intervening processes. 
11 Attempts to provide this explanation suggest that the proposed fusion process is actually something else 
entirely. Specifically, CBDTE suggests two things about this process: (a) It includes the comparison of 
newly acquired beliefs with existing beliefs and desires, for without the detection of a belief-desire match or 
mismatch, no emotion will result (Reisenzein, 2009a); (b) beyond the belief-desire comparison, no further 
process is needed to explain the hedonic quality, as well as the intensity, of emotions. Hence, CBDTE sug-
gests that the process in question is one of comparing beliefs and desires, not of fusing them into a new 




offers a neat explanation of the intentionality of emotions—the theory of intentional pleas-
ure feelings has to cope with a number of difficulties: It has been debated whether proposi-
tional attitudes have phenomenal character (see Bayne & Montague, 2011), and it is not 
clear what the semantic properties (conditions of satisfaction; see Green, 1992) of object-
directed feelings would be. The hypothesis that the carrier of the hedonic tone of emotions 
is an objectless sensation-like feeling of pleasure or displeasure avoids these problems. For 
this and other reasons (Reisenzein, 2009a; b), I prefer this hypothesis to the “intentional 
feeling” theory. However, it should be noted that the “intentional feeling” theory is similar 
enough to the “sensory feeling” theory to be regarded, at least in the present context, as a 
variant of the latter: Both theories assume that the affective component of emotions is a he-
donic feeling, but in one case this feeling is intrinsically objectless, whereas in the other 
case, it is directed at the object of the emotion. 
3.2 Explaining the Intensity of Emotions 
Emotions are not just present or absent; rather, they can be instantiated in different degrees 
or gradations, ranging from just noticeable to extremely intense. For example, one can be a 
little, moderately, or very happy; or mildly, somewhat, or extremely surprised. Intensity has 
been neglected in theoretical discussions of emotion. Nevertheless, it is an undisputed, sali-
ent feature of emotions that, therefore, any plausible theory of emotion must explain (Fri-
jda, Ortony, Sonnemans, & Clore, 1992; Green, 1992; Pugmire, 1998; Reisenzein, 1994b). 
I submit that, just like the phenomenal quality of emotions, the intensity of emotions cannot 
be explained in terms of belief and desire alone. To account for the intensity of emotions, 
another component of emotions needs to be posited; and the best candidate for this addi-
tional component, I submit, is a sensation-like feeling.  
In CBDTE, this idea is implemented as follows: It is assumed that “emotional” constel-
lations of beliefs and desires cause sensation-like feeling qualities, and that the intensity of 
these feelings is a quantitative function of belief and desire strength (Reisenzein, 2009a; 
2009b). Because quality and intensity are essential properties of sensations (Külpe, 1893; 
Wundt, 1896), these assumptions allow CBDTE to simultaneously explain the phenomenal 
quality and the intensity of emotions in a natural way: Emotions are signals produced by 
the belief-desire and belief-belief comparator mechanisms that are experienced as feelings, 
and the intensity of the emotions is simply the intensity of these feelings (Reisenzein, 
2009b). Again, although I believe that this is the best available explanation of emotion in-
tensity, I will first argue for a weaker claim: To account for the intensity of emotions in 
BDTE, it is necessary to posit a separate mental state caused by beliefs and desires, one that 
carries emotional intensity.  
One argument for this conclusion can be obtained by an extension of the preceding ar-
gument concerning the explanation of hedonic quality. The hedonic quality of emotions it-
self has an intensity; it can occur in different degrees (Reisenzein, 1994b). If the carrier of 
the hedonic tone of emotions is a separate mental state caused by beliefs and desires, then 
the different intensities of pleasure and displeasure must be carried by (different specifica-
tions of) this separate mental state.  
However, the conclusion that the intensity of emotions is carried by a separate mental 
state can also be arrived at independently of the phenomenal quality argument, by consider-
ing the problems that confront BDTE theorists who attempt to explain the intensity of emo-
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tions in terms of belief and desire alone. Again, these theorists have two principal options: 
They can try to explain the intensity of emotions by appealing to the intensities of beliefs 
and desires, or they can assume that emotion intensity is an emergent property of the fusion 
of “emotional” belief-desire constellations (Green, 1992). 
3.2.1 Explaining Emotion Intensity by Appealing to the Intensities of Beliefs and 
Desires  
(1) The intensities of belief and desire, considered separately, are unsuited to explain the in-
tensity of emotions. Equating emotion intensity with belief strength does not work for the 
simple reason that belief strength has a clear upper bound (certainty), whereas the intensity 
of emotions has no definite upper bound. Furthermore, if emotion intensity were identified 
with belief strength, then emotions connected to beliefs held with certainty (the “emotions 
of certainty”; Green, 1992; Meinong, 1894), such as joy, could not vary in intensity. Nei-
ther can emotion intensity be equated with the strength of desire. In the case of the “emo-
tions of certainty,” this idea may at first seem to have some plausibility: Mary feels more 
joy about Schroiber being elected chancellor the more she desires this event to happen; so 
perhaps the intensity of Mary’s happiness is simply the intensity of the desire. However, the 
intensity of the “emotions of uncertainty” (Green, 1992; Meinong, 1894), hope and fear, 
depends on both belief strength and desire strength. For example, Mary is more strongly 
afraid that she may miss her connecting plane the more probable this event appears to her 
and the more averse she is to it. Analogously, the intensities of disappointment and relief 
depend on both belief and desire strength (for empirical evidence, see e.g., Reisenzein & 
Junge, 2006).  
(2) The intensity of emotion also cannot be equated with the intensity of “emotional” be-
lief-desire configurations. The intensity of these configurations is, minimally, a two-
dimensional magnitude of the kind <b(p), d(p)>, whereas the intensity of emotion is a one-
dimensional quantity, and is at least in some cases (e.g., hope, fear, disappointment, and re-
lief) a joint function of the intensities of the involved beliefs and desires (Reisenzein, 
2009a).  
3.2.2 Emotion Intensity as an Emergent Property  
To overcome these difficulties, one could again propose that emotions result from a fusion 
of “emotional” belief-desire constellations, and that the intensity of emotions is an emer-
gent property of the resulting mental states (Green, 1992). However, this proposal provokes 
objections exactly parallel to those raised against the “emergentist” explanation of hedonic 
quality. One part of the proposal—“emotional” belief-desire constellations cause another 
mental state that is the carrier of emotion intensity—is identical to the hypothesis I pres-
ently seek to establish, and thus grants this hypothesis. The second part of the proposal 
claims that the new mental state, the carrier of emotion intensity, is a compound of beliefs 
and desires. This claim is at best a promissory note for an explanation as long as the fusion 
process is not spelled out, and CBDTE suggests that this process is actually one of compar-
ing, rather than fusing, beliefs and desires. 
The failure of the attempts to explain the intensity of emotions in terms of the intensities 
of belief and desire suggests that the latter are insufficient to explain the intensity of emo-
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tions. To explain emotion intensity in BDTE, an additional mental state, caused by “emo-
tional” belief-desire constellations, needs to be posited. This conclusion does not per se en-
tail that this mental state, the carrier of emotion intensity, is a sensation-like, intrinsically 
objectless feeling. An alternative is again that emotions are a class of mental states sui 
generis, which are simultaneously feelings and object-directed. As mentioned in Section 
3.1.2, the “intentional feeling” hypothesis has a number of problems that make me prefer 
the sensory feeling hypothesis. However, in the present context, the “intentional feeling” 
and the “sensory feeling” hypotheses of the nature of emotions can be regarded as variants 
of one and the same proposal. 
4. Two Unconvincing Arguments for the Belief-Desire Compound 
Theory of Emotion 
Because phenomenal quality and intensity are essential properties of sensations, the as-
sumption that emotions contain a sensory feeling component makes it possible to explain 
both the phenomenal quality and the intensity of emotional experiences in a natural way. 
Why then not simply assume that emotions are the feelings of pleasure and displeasure 
(and a few others, such as surprise) caused by the detection of, inter alia, desire-fulfillment 
and desire-frustration, as assumed by CBDTE? Why assume that beliefs and desires, too, 
are components of the emotion, as Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) propose? Two main ar-
guments have been advanced for this theory of the nature of emotions: the emotion differen-
tiation argument and the intentionality argument. It has been claimed that only by conceiv-
ing of beliefs and desires as parts of the emotion can one explain (a) the finer distinctions 
between emotions—possibly all distinctions beyond positive and negative—and (b) the in-
tentionality or object-directedness of emotions. However, although these arguments have 
been influential, they are ultimately unconvincing (see also Reisenzein, 2000; Reisenzein & 
Döring, 2009). 
4.1 Why the Emotion Differentiation Argument Fails 
Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) refer to the emotion differentiation argument to motivate 
their theory that emotions are compounds of beliefs, desires, and affect. They argue that, al-
though “the feeling of pleasantness and unpleasantness [is]…one essential component of 
emotional experience”, beliefs and desires need to be added “to produce distinct emotions” 
(pp. 223-224). However, one can accept that beliefs and desires are necessary to distinguish 
between emotions without assuming that emotions contain beliefs and desires as (ontologi-
cal) parts. A main reason for this is that mental states need not—and, if causal-role func-
tionalism about mental states (e.g., Block, 1980) is right, cannot—be defined and distin-
guished from one another exclusively in terms of their intrinsic or nonrelational properties; 
they can also be defined and distinguished in terms of their relational features, in particular, 
their causes and consequences. Partly causal definitions are in fact common in everyday 
language. To mention a standard example, “sunburn” is defined as an “inflammation of the 
skin caused by over-exposure to sunlight” (Gordon, 1978, p. 125). Analogously, emotions 
could be defined as the feelings (e.g., of pleasure or displeasure) that are caused by particu-
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lar constellations of beliefs and desires (see also Reisenzein, 1994a; 1994b; Reisenzein & 
Schönpflug, 1992). For example, happiness about p could be defined as the feeling of 
pleasure caused by the desire for p and the belief that p is the case. In fact, this is how emo-
tional experiences are defined in CBDTE (Reisenzein, 2009a).12 In adopting a (partly) 
causal definition of emotions, CBDTE finds itself in agreement with the position of causal-
role functionalism in the philosophy of mind, the metaphysical backbone of contemporary 
cognitivism (e.g., Block, 1980; Fodor, 1975). It also finds itself in agreement with the 
views of many cognitive emotion theorists from Aristotle (about 350 B.C.) to Arnold 
(1960)13 and with the folk-psychological understanding of mentalistic terms in general 
(Lewis, 1972) and emotion terms in particular (e.g., Reisenzein & Junge, 2012; Siemer, 
2008).  
The existence of causal-functional definitions of emotions (in both scientific and com-
mon-sense psychology) means that the emotion differentiation argument is invalid: The 
claim that beliefs and desires are necessary to distinguish between emotions does not entail 
that beliefs and desires are components of emotions. The belief that this inference is logi-
cally valid may have been due to an inadvertent confusion of the conceptual-linguistic and 
ontological levels of analysis: the concepts “belief,” “desire,” “happiness,” “fear,” etc., and 
the referents of these concepts. This confusion could have been facilitated by the fact that 
part-whole relations exist on both levels. Suppose that an emotion researcher sets out to 
clarify the nature of emotions and presents the results of this analysis in the form of a theo-
retical definition that states necessary features. To illustrate, suppose that the researcher de-
fines or analyzes the concept “being happy about p” using the concepts “believing p” and 
“desiring p.” In this case, the latter concepts are components of the former concept in the 
sense that they (or the terms that express them) are parts of the proposed definiens or analy-
sans of “being happy about p.” It might then be concluded that the referents of “believing 
p” and “desiring p” (the mental states of believing and desiring) are likewise parts of the 
referent of “being happy about p” (the mental state of happiness). However, this would be 
too quick: The concept “being happy about p” could be defined functionally, for example, 
as “the feeling of pleasure caused by the belief that p and the desire for p.”  
Some proponents of the thesis that emotions contain beliefs and desires (or other mental 
states) as parts may in fact only have had a conceptual part-whole relation in mind, with no 
implications for the ontological level. In previous writings on emotion, Miceli and Cas-
telfranchi (e.g., 2002), too, seem to use the expression “belief B and desire D are compo-
                                                          
12 To be precise, emotions and emotional experiences are defined in CBDTE on the computational level of 
system analysis. Emotions are the output signals of hardwired mechanisms that compare new beliefs with 
existing beliefs and desires (Reisenzein, 2009a, b). These signals can remain unconscious (e.g., when they 
are below a minimum level of intensity), but usually, they give rise to emotional experiences, which are 
conscious feelings of pleasure and displeasure, surprise and expectancy-confirmation, mixtures of these, 
plus hope and fear. On the phenomenological or intentional level of system analysis—that knows nothing 
about the representational codes and computational mechanisms underlying beliefs and desires—these ex-
periences can be defined as emotional feelings that are caused by particular belief-desire configurations. 
13 In his Rhetoric, Aristotle defined fear as a kind of displeasure or perturbation arising from the idea of im-
pending evil. Descartes (1649) defined several of his nonbasic emotions as subtypes of basic feelings whose 
distinguishing features consist of their being caused by particular types of appraisals. Stumpf (1899) pro-
posed that emotions are belief-caused pro- or con-evaluations of states of affairs (see Reisenzein & 
Schönpflug, 1992). Arnold (1960) defined emotions as felt action tendencies caused by cognitive apprais-
als. In previous work, I proposed a causalist version of appraisal theory, according to which emotions are 
appraisal-caused mixtures of pleasure or displeasure and activation or deactivation (Reisenzein, 1994b). 
Further examples of functional definitions of emotion are referenced in Reisenzein and Schönpflug (1992). 
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nents of emotion E” in the conceptual part-whole sense only. Understood in this way, the 
claim that beliefs and desires are parts of emotions does not go beyond the basic claim of 
BDTE, that beliefs and desires are necessary for emotions, and is thus compatible with dif-
ferent ontological interpretations. However, in their 2009 article, Castelfranchi and Miceli 
take a stronger stance on the issue: There, they assume that beliefs and desires are ontologi-
cal parts of the emotion.  
In taking this stronger position, Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) could have been moti-
vated by the consideration that, even though the assumption that beliefs and desires are on-
tological parts of emotions may not be needed to explain the differences between emotions 
in general, it may be needed to explain their differences in phenomenal quality. That is, it 
could be argued that conceiving of beliefs and desires as mere causes of emotions does not 
explain how different emotions can feel different to the experiencer in ways that go beyond 
pleasure and displeasure (and perhaps a few other feelings). To explain, for example, why 
happiness feels different from pride, one must appeal to the components of emotional ex-
periences, rather than to their causes. 
However, this argument is also unconvincing. For one reason, its implicit general prem-
ise—nothing short of a proper part of an experience can contribute to that experience’s 
phenomenal character—can be doubted. The mental context of an emotional feeling, in-
cluding its causes and consequences, might conceivably change the experience of that feel-
ing (Reisenzein, 2009b). For another reason, even if one accepts the general premise of the 
argument, the conclusion does not follow. First, there may in fact be nothing to explain: 
The argument may rest on a confusion of the differences between emotions with differences 
in the phenomenal quality of emotions. There is no question that, for example, happiness 
and pride differ—they differ, in particular, in their cognitive-motivational preconditions. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that happiness and pride feel different: Not every 
difference between emotions needs to be a felt difference, a difference in experiential qual-
ity. In terms of experiential quality, happiness and pride might be exactly alike: both feel 
pleasant (e.g., Bentham, 1789/1970; Külpe, 1893); any cognized differences between hap-
piness and pride could be due to differences in the perceived causes (and consequences) of 
the feeling of pleasure. Second, regarding beliefs and desires as emotion components may 
not be of much help in explaining the phenomenal quality of emotions, for as mentioned 
before (3.1.1), beliefs and desires may not have phenomenal properties, or at least none that 
could explain differences in emotional experience. In this context, it is important to note 
that the subtler distinctions between “emotional” belief-desire constellations concern differ-
ences in their contents—differences in what is believed and desired (see Castelfranchi and 
Miceli, 2009, for examples). To explain presumed subtle experiential differences between 
emotions in terms of belief and desire, one must therefore assume that at least some differ-
ences in the contents of beliefs and desires are reflected in phenomenal experience (see 
Bayne & Montague, 2011).  
4.2 Why the Intentionality Argument Fails  
The second introspectively salient property of emotional experiences, apart from their phe-
nomenal quality (including their intensity) is their (apparent) intentionality or object-
directedness: Typically at least, emotions present themselves to the experiencer as being di-
rected at certain objects. For the emotions that fall within the purview of BDTE, these ob-
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jects are propositions or states of affairs (e.g., Mary feels happy about the fact that 
Schroiber was elected chancellor). The intentionality argument holds that, to account for 
the object-directedness of emotions, one must assume that beliefs and desires are not just 
causes but components of emotions (see e.g., Green, 1992; Pitcher, 1965; Reisenzein & 
Schönpflug, 1992; Solomon, 1976). The intentionality argument is arguably the strongest 
argument for regarding cognitions (as well as, in the case of BDTE, desires) as components 
of emotions (Green, 1992; see also, Whiting, 2011). Nevertheless, this argument is not wa-
terproof either. There are at least two ways in which the causal feeling theorist can avoid 
the conclusion of the intentionality argument.  
The first way out is to accept the initial premise of the argument, that emotions are ob-
ject-directed, but argue that emotions are a separate kind of object-directed mental states, 
distinct from but caused by beliefs and desires. In Sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2, I mentioned a 
special version of this idea: the hypothesis that the feeling of pleasure caused by the belief 
that p and the desire for p is intrinsically directed at p.14 However, as also mentioned there, 
it is debatable whether propositional attitudes can have phenomenal quality, and it is un-
clear what the semantic properties of object-directed feelings would be. For these reasons, I 
prefer the second option available to the causal feeling theorist; one that avoids these prob-
lems. This option consists of denying the initial premise of the intentionality argument, that 
emotions are object-directed. Note that this is not meant to deny that emotions appear to 
be, in a presystematic sense of the term, “directed at” objects; for example, that Mary’s 
happiness appears to her to “focus” on Schroiber’s election victory. Rather, the argument is 
that this subjective appearance of focus does not reflect a genuine intentional relation 
(Reisenzein, 2009a). That is, whereas the experienced object focus of emotions may be 
reminiscent of true intentional (i.e., representational) relations such as believing p or desir-
ing p, closer examination reveals that it is not a genuine representational relation after all.  
The plausibility of this suggestion depends, among others, on whether a plausible expla-
nation of the illusion of intentionality of emotions can be given. CBDTE offers an explana-
tion: According to this theory, the illusion of object-directedness can be traced to the spe-
cial way the emotion-generating mechanisms operate (Reisenzein, 2009a). For example, 
when the belief-desire comparator detects that the contents of a newly acquired belief 
Bel(p) match the contents of an existing desire Des(p), it generates a feeling of pleasure 
and, simultaneously, focuses attention on the responsible proposition p. It then appears to 
the person that she is pleased about p. Furthermore, it seems conceivable that subsequent 
cognitive processes bind feelings to the representations of the objects of the beliefs that 
proximately caused them, transforming these initially neutral thoughts into “affectively 
tinged” thoughts about these objects (Reisenzein, 2009a; 2009b; see also James, 
1890/1950). For example, the feeling of pleasure caused by Mary’s belief that Schroiber 
won the election might get attached to the mental representation of Schroiber’s election vic-
tory, resulting in Mary’s thought of a pleasurable victory. Alternatively, the appearance of 
object-directedness might be due to an implicit causal attribution of the feeling (Reisenzein, 
1994a; Schachter, 1964).  
                                                          
14 The gestalt theory of emotion, too, implies that emotions (emotional gestalts) are caused by beliefs and 
desires (Castelfranchi & Miceli, 2009). However, the resultant emotional gestalts are still thought to contain 
beliefs and desires as components. Therefore, this proposal is not sufficiently different from the part-whole 
theory to be regarded as a real alternative. 
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I conclude that the two main arguments in favor of the idea that beliefs and desires are 
components of emotions—the emotion differentiation argument and the intentionality ar-
gument—are unconvincing. 
5. Three Problems for the Belief-Desire Compound Theory of Emotion 
I argued that the two main arguments for the belief-desire compound theory of the nature of 
emotions are not compelling. However, this does not necessarily mean that this theory is 
wrong and the causal feeling theory is correct. It only means that, to decide this issue, we 
must turn to other arguments. In the following section, I present three arguments that speak 
directly against the belief-desire compound theory of emotion.15 
5.1 The Problem of Emotional Intentionality – Still Unsolved 
In Section 4.2, I argued that one need not regard beliefs and desires as ontological parts of 
emotions to explain the (apparent) intentionality of emotions: One can either deny that 
emotions are truly intentional (representational), in which case their object-directedness 
need not be explained; or one can argue that emotions are a separate class of intentional 
mental states caused by beliefs and desires. However, none of this touches the claim of the 
belief-desire compound theorists, that taking beliefs and desires to be components of emo-
tions provides another viable explanation for the intentionality of emotions. Furthermore, 
belief-desire compound theorists could argue that their explanation is preferable because it 
neither requires questioning the intentionality of emotions nor introducing new question-
able mental entities (object-directed feelings). I will now argue that the belief-desire com-
pound theory of emotion, at least in its original form, is in fact unable to explain the inten-
tionality of emotions. The reason is that this theory does not allow for correctly identifying 
the objects of emotions—“correctly” here meaning “the way we intuitively identify them in 
everyday life.”  
Suppose Oscar is sad that he was not invited to a party. According to the belief-desire 
compound theory of emotion, Oscar’s sadness is a compound mental state that emerges, via 
a gestalt formation process, from Oscar’s belief that he was not invited to the party, and his 
desire to be invited (plus, in Castelfranchi and Miceli’s version of the theory, a feeling of 
displeasure). The object of Oscar’s sadness is the state of affairs described, from the first-
person perspective, by the sentence “I am not invited to the party” (not-p), which is identi-
cal to the object of Oscar’s belief. The object of Oscar’s desire, however, is the state of af-
fairs described by “I am invited to the party” (p). Hence, if Bel(not-p) and Des(p) are both 
components of Oscar’s sadness, it would seem that the emotion has two different objects 
that in addition, are contradictory opposites: p and not-p. But although Oscar is sad that he 
was not invited to the party (not-p), it is not the case that he is sad that he was invited (p); 
nor is it the case that he is sad about a contradiction (not-p & p). In fact, since Oscar does 
                                                          
15 The first two arguments also speak against a categorization account (e.g., Barrett, 2006; Mandler, 1984) 
of the “fusion” of beliefs and desires into an emotion.  
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not believe p, he cannot—according to BDTE—be sad about p. And if he believed p, he 
would be happy rather than sad about p. 
Parallel cases can be constructed for other emotions including surprise—in general, for 
all emotions that occur when a desire is frustrated by a newly acquired belief, or when a 
previous belief is disconfirmed by a new belief. Take surprise: If Oscar expects to be in-
vited to the party (p), and then comes to believe that he was not invited (not-p), he will be 
surprised about not-p. If belief-desire compound theorists of emotion analyze surprise in a 
way that parallels their analysis of hedonic emotions—that is, by including the necessary 
cognitive preconditions of surprise into the emotional compound—they have to regard both 
the belief that not-p and the belief that p as components of surprise. However, it is not the 
case that Oscar is surprised that he was invited to the party (p), nor is it the case that he is 
surprised about a contradiction (not-p & p). Likewise, if Oscar both desires and expects to 
be invited to the party (p), and then learns that he is not invited (not-p), he will be disap-
pointed about not-p; he will not be disappointed about p, nor about not-p & p. 
In sum, emotions on the one hand, and their cognitive and motivational preconditions on 
the other hand, have the same propositional objects only in part. The object of the emotion 
corresponds to that of the proximate (according to CBDTE, the most recently acquired) 
emotion-relevant belief, such as in the present example, Oscar’s belief that he is not invited 
to the party. By contrast, the propositional objects of the emotion-relevant desires and pre-
existing beliefs can be contradictory opposites of the object of the emotion (e.g., Oscar’s 
desire to be invited to the party, and his belief that he would be). Therefore, it seems that 
emotions cannot be identified with compounds that include the cognitive and motivational 
preconditions of the emotions—at least not all of them.16 
To solve this problem, Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) might appeal to the proposed ge-
stalt formation process: They could argue that one effect of this process consists precisely 
of providing the emotional gestalt with a single appropriate object. However, without fur-
ther elaboration, this escape is too simple. Similar to the attempt to explain the hedonic 
quality and intensity of emotions by postulating that emotions are the outcomes of a process 
of a fusion of beliefs and desires whose details are left unspecified (see 3.1.2 and 3.2.2), the 
gestalt formation process here plays the role of a deus ex machina—it is simply ascribed 
whatever causal powers are needed to yield an output with desired properties (in the present 
case, a mental state with a particular object). We still do not understand why the emotion 
has only one object and why that object is identical to the object of the “proximate” belief, 
rather than to the object of the desire, or that of a pre-existing belief. Shall we assume that 
the desire and the pre-existing belief lose their objects when they become part of the emo-
tional gestalt? But in this case, they would cease to exist; it belongs to the essence of beliefs 
and desires to be directed at objects. Furthermore, if the object of the emotional gestalt is 
                                                          
16 Maria Miceli (personal communication) suggested that the object of Oscar’s sadness might in fact not be 
not-p, but q = “my desire for p was frustrated.” However, intuitively this seems wrong: Oscar is first and 
foremost sad that he was not invited to the party (not-p); he is not, or at least not only, sad that his desire for 
p was frustrated. Analogously, Oscar is surprised that he was not invited to the party; he is not, or at least 
not only, surprised that his belief that p would occur was disconfirmed (Reisenzein, 2009a). Independent of 
this issue, because q is different from both the object of the belief (not-p) and the object of the desire (p) 
underlying Oscar’s sadness, Miceli’s proposal makes it even more difficult for belief-desire compound 
theorists to explain the specific object-directedness of the emotion. And if they assume that Oscar is sad 
about q because he desired not-q and then came to believe that q, the original problem arises again: Oscar is 
sad only about q; he is not sad about not-q, nor about q & not-q.  
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the object of its belief component, can one really say that the emotion, rather than just its 
belief component, is directed at this object?  
Even assuming that the problem of providing the emotional compound with the appro-
priate intentional object can be solved, another problem remains for Castelfranchi and Mi-
celi’s (2009) gestalt theory. Recall that according to this theory, emotions are mental ge-
stalts that integrate beliefs, desires, and hedonic feelings (pleasure or displeasure). These 
hedonic feelings are regarded as intrinsically nonintentional. This raises the following ques-
tion: Do the feelings become object-directed in the process of being integrated into the 
emotion? If yes, how is this feat achieved (Green, 1992)? If no, can one truly say that the 
emotion is directed at an object? 
The more natural conclusion to draw from Oscar’s case, it seems to me, is that at least 
desires and pre-existing beliefs are not parts of the emotion, but only their causes. Accept-
ing this conclusion would mean, for Castelfranchi and Miceli’s (2009) theory, that only the 
proximate belief and affect remain as components of the emotion (with the belief being a 
partial cause of the affect). This modified version of the belief-desire compound theory of 
emotion is already fairly close to the causal feeling theory. The main remaining difference 
concerns the question of whether the proximate belief is part of the emotion or not. I come 
back to this question at the end of the article. 
5.2 Problems with Emotion Duration  
A necessary requirement for the correctness of the belief-desire compound theory of emo-
tion is that the elements of the compound are present during the emotion while it lasts. This 
is clear for the part-whole version of the belief-desire theory proposed by Marks (1982), 
where the emotion is defined as the co-existence of appropriate beliefs and desires. How-
ever, it is also the case for the gestalt theory version of BDTE (Castelfranchi & Miceli, 
2009; see also Green, 1992, p. 81), for the gestalt-forming process produces an emotional 
gestalt only as long as it receives adequate inputs, the emotion components. To use Cas-
telfranchi and Miceli’s example of perceptual gestalt formation, the perception of a triangle 
exists only as long as the lines representing the sides of the triangle are perceived. If one of 
the lines is no longer visible, the perception of the triangle disintegrates. 
I submit that this implication of the belief-desire compound theory of emotion—
emotions are present only while their components are present—is not in line with the em-
pirical facts. The discrepancy between theory and data is perhaps most apparent for desire-
fulfillment emotions such as joy, but parallel discrepancies also exist for surprise and other 
emotional reactions to belief disconfirmation (e.g., disappointment, relief). In the case of 
the desire-fulfillment emotions, the problem is that, due to the updating of the belief-desire 
system that follows the detection of desire-fulfillment, the desire is usually deleted while 
the emotion still lasts. In the case of the expectancy-disconfirmation emotions, the problem 
is that the pre-existing belief with which a newly acquired belief is compared is changed 
while the emotion still persists. Another way of phrasing the problem is therefore that the 
temporal course, specifically the duration, of some emotions is not well explained by the 
belief-desire compound theory.  
According to BDTE, Mary experiences happiness about p if she desires p and comes to 
believe that p is the case. Computationally speaking, happiness occurs if a cognitive sub-
system (in CBDTE, the belief-desire comparator) detects that a desire has been fulfilled. 
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However, according to the usual understanding of “desire”, desires are extinguished by 
their detected fulfillment. As Meinong (1917, p. 96) put it, as soon as one comes to believe 
that a desired state of affairs exists, “the desire is destroyed; this is the subjective aspect of 
what is called…the fulfillment of the desire” (my translation). But if the desire for p is ex-
tinguished by the detection of its fulfillment, then the belief that p and desire for p are co-
present in the cognitive system only as long as it takes to detect their congruence and to de-
lete the desire (Reisenzein, 2009a). These are presumably primitive operations of the belief-
desire updating mechanism that should accordingly take only minimal time (perhaps 300 
ms; see Madl, Baars, & Franklin, 2011). Furthermore, strictly speaking, the emotion comes 
into existence only after desire-congruence has been detected. As a consequence, the emo-
tion of joy should in general be an extremely short-lived occurrence, perhaps too short to be 
subjectively noticeable, rather than lasting for a while, as it typically seems to do (e.g., Fri-
jda et al., 1992).  
A parallel objection can be raised in the case of surprise. Surprise is experienced if a 
cognitive module (in CBDTE, the belief-belief comparator) detects that a newly acquired 
belief is contrary to an existing belief. For example, Mary expects Schroiber will not win 
the election, but then learns that he, in fact, won. As soon as the belief-belief comparator 
detects that the newly acquired belief contradicts the old, the old belief is deleted; a process 
that presumably takes only a fraction of a second. By contrast, according to subjective trac-
ings of the temporal course of surprise, the experience of surprise typically lasts for several 
seconds (Reisenzein, Bördgen, Holtbernd, & Matz, 2006). And in the case of pleasant sur-
prise, both the pre-existing desire and the pre-existing belief are updated while the emotion 
still persists. 
Belief-desire compound theorists of emotion could try to solve this problem, in the case 
of the desire-fulfillment emotions, by bringing in other desires, such as, in our example, 
Mary’s desire that Schroiber will remain chancellor for as long as possible or that he will 
keep his campaign promises. But apart from the fact that it is not plausible that one experi-
ences joy only if, at the subjective fulfillment of a desire, other related desires spring into 
existence, the problem is thereby not solved but only deferred. The desire that Schroiber 
will keep his campaign promises is different from the desire that Schroiber will win the 
election; correspondingly, the joy experienced when learning that Schroiber has kept his 
promises is different from the joy about Schroiber’s election victory. And the former feel-
ing of joy should be experienced only when the corresponding wish is subjectively fulfilled 
and as a consequence, extinguished. Analogous objections can be raised against the attempt 
to explain the duration of surprise by bringing in additional disconfirmed beliefs. 
A more promising strategy of dealing with the present objection would be to argue that, 
notwithstanding the above-mentioned theoretical considerations, fulfilled desires are in fact 
not extinguished immediately, and disconfirmed beliefs are not immediately deleted, but 
that the process of desire and belief updating takes time—just enough time for joy or sur-
prise to occur and subside again. Emotions are experienced only while the desire and belief, 
or the old and new belief, are simultaneously present in the cognitive system, as assumed 
by the belief-desire compound theory. This seems to be an empirically testable difference 
between the belief-desire compound theory and the causal feeling theory; however, I do not 
know of firm empirical data that would allow for a decision regarding this issue. In the ab-
sence of supporting data, these auxiliary assumptions about the relative duration of belief 
and desire updates, and of the associated emotions, strike me as ad hoc. In any case, it 
should be realized that the belief-desire compound theory entails strong empirical assump-
tions about the relative duration of emotions and belief-desire updates. The causal feeling 
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theory does not require making these assumptions; it is equally well compatible with a vari-
ety of empirical data concerning this issue. 
5.3 Are There Emotional Gestalts?  
Castelfranchi and Miceli’s (2009) gestalt theory of emotion would be on firmer ground if 
there were independent evidence that the emotional gestalts with which they identify emo-
tions do exist (although they would then still have to argue for the identity of emotions and 
emotional gestalts). However, the existence of emotional gestalts is by no means certain. 
Emotional gestalts could be theoretical constructs that lack empirical referents. If so, the be-
lief-desire compound theory of the nature of emotion cannot be correct, for surely, emo-
tions cannot be identified with nonexistents (Reisenzein, 2007). 
Whereas Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) appeal to introspection to support the existence 
of emotional gestalts, I must admit that I do not share their intuitions. According to my in-
trospection, when I am happy about some state of affairs p that fulfills a wish of mine, I am 
not experiencing a complex mental state that comprises the desire for p and the belief that 
p. Rather, I become aware that p is the case, and this thought is immediately followed and 
accompanied by an upsurge of pleasant feeling, that after a shorter or longer while, subsides 
again. I would also be willing to admit to an impression of phenomenal causality (Heider, 
1958), in that the feeling appears to be caused by the thought that p. These introspective in-
tuitions agree with those of others who have considered the issue (e.g., Meinong, 1906; 
Whiting, 2011). However, I am not aware of a fusion of belief and desire taking place (and 
as argued in 5.2, such an integration cannot take place because the desire is extinguished by 
its fulfillment). To the degree that anything like an integration occurs at all, it seems to con-
cern only the object of the emotion p and the feeling: When thinking of the state of affairs p 
that I believe to be the case, it presents itself to me not just as a state of affairs that is real, 
but also as a pleasurable state of affairs (cf. James, 1890/1950).  
These introspective worries about the existence of emotional gestalts of the kind re-
quired by Castelfranchi and Miceli’s (2009) theory are reinforced by theoretically moti-
vated concerns about the proposed gestalt formation process. As mentioned, the claim that 
emotions are the outcome of a process that integrates different components into a whole 
with suitable emergent properties runs the risk of being a pseudo-explanation—one simply 
imputes to the fusion process whatever causal powers are needed to produce outputs with 
the desired properties (e.g., intensity, a specific object). To avoid this danger, one must be-
come more specific about the integration process. Castelfranchi and Miceli (2009) go some 
way toward explicating the integration process by proposing that it is analogous to gestalt-
forming processes known from perception (e.g., Köhler, 1947). However, it should be ac-
knowledged that the inputs of the emotional gestalt formation process (beliefs, desires, and 
hedonic feelings) differ significantly from the typical inputs of the perceptual gestalt forma-
tion processes (e.g., visual perceptions of lines), and so do their outputs (emotions versus 
e.g., the perception of geometrical figures). Given these peculiarities of the gestalt forma-
tion process in the case of emotions, it would be helpful to know that analogous gestalt 
formations, involving similar mental elements, occur in other, less controversial domains. 
However, gestalt formation processes have been nearly exclusively studied in the domain of 
perception. It therefore remains at present uncertain whether their extension to emotions re-
ally works.  
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6. The Causal Feeling Theory Vindicated 
To recapitulate, I first argued that sensation-like feelings are a necessary component of 
emotions: This assumption is an inference to the best explanation of the phenomenal char-
acter (specifically the hedonic quality) of emotions and their intensity. Second, I argued that 
the two main arguments for regarding beliefs and desires as components of emotions—the 
emotion differentiation argument and the intentionality argument—are unconvincing. 
Third, I presented three objections to the hypothesis that beliefs and desires are components 
of emotions: This hypothesis fails, at second sight, to explain the directedness of emotions 
at specific objects; it has difficulty accounting for the duration of emotional reactions to the 
fulfillment of desires and the disconfirmation of beliefs; and there are reasons to question 
the existence of the postulated emotional gestalts and the process that presumably generates 
them. 
The causal feeling theory of the nature of emotions avoids these problems. By assuming 
that emotional experiences are nonpropositional signals that, when conscious, are experi-
enced as feelings, this theory accounts in a natural way for the phenomenal character of 
emotions and their intensity. It also vindicates our everyday talk of beliefs and desires as 
causes of emotions—something the belief-desire compound theory of emotion achieves 
only with some difficulty (see Footnote 4). The finer distinctions among emotions—those 
not attributable to differences in feelings—can be explained by assuming that emotions are, 
in part, distinguished by their cognitive and motivational causes (and consequences).  
The price one may have to pay for these explanatory virtues of the causal feeling theory 
is the concession that—counter to linguistic practices and first phenomenological intui-
tions—emotions are not modes of representing propositional objects like beliefs and desires 
are. However, this may just be how things are. Furthermore, as mentioned, the belief-desire 
compound theory is incapable of explaining the specific object-directedness of emotions; it 
therefore presents no real advantage to the causal feeling theory in this respect. And by as-
suming that emotional feelings can be bound to the objects of the beliefs that cause them, 
resulting in “emotionally tinged” thoughts about them—or even more simply, that people 
form beliefs about the causes of their emotional feelings (Schachter, 1964; Reisenzein, 
1994a; 1994b)—the cognitive (information-providing) and motivational functions of emo-
tions can be saved without assuming that emotions themselves have propositional objects 
(Reisenzein, 2009b). 
The last-mentioned elaboration of the causal feeling theory points to a possible recon-
ciliation with the belief-desire compound theory: To solve the problems with explaining the 
intentionality and duration of emotions, and to avoid the uncertainties surrounding the pos-
tulated gestalt formation process and its outcomes, Castelfranchi and Miceli could modify 
their theory of the nature of emotions by proposing that only hedonic feelings and their 
proximate cognitive causes (beliefs), but not pre-existing beliefs and desires, are compo-
nents of the emotion; the latter are only its causes. According to this revised version of the 
gestalt theory of emotion, Mary’s happiness about p would be a mental state that emerges 
from the integration of the belief that p, with the pleasure caused by this belief plus Mary’s 
desire for p. In the next step, the integration process could be explicated as the binding of 
sensory and propositional representations into an “affectively tinged” thought (Reisenzein, 
2009a). The remaining difference to the causal feeling theory would then concern the ques-
tion of whether the emotion is to be identified with the (signal underlying the) affective 
feeling, or with the “affectively tinged” thought resulting from the binding of the feeling to 
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the representation of p (in CBDTE, the sentence s in the language of thought representing 
p). I continue to believe that the former theoretical definition of emotion is more adequate 
because it accounts better, overall, for the different properties of emotions. In particular, the 
signal underlying the emotional feelings is the common cause of both emotional experience 
and the physiological and expressive effects of emotions (Reisenzein, 2009a; 2009b).  
However, an in-depth discussion of this question must be left to another occasion.  
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